Waimakariri District’s Recovery: - Shaken and Stirred

CDEM Controller Development Programme – Recovery Case Study
31 July 2015
Simon Markham, Waimakariri District Council
Presentation
Scope

- Waimakariri and earthquakes context
- Recovery Management context and issues
- Recovery approach and process
- Recovery programmes scope/nature
- Secondary stressors/impacts
- Learning and reflections
Waimakariri District

- Fast growing ‘peri-urban’ district of 55,000 population in North Canterbury
- 80% of population live within 10km of east coast
- Several main towns:
  - Rangiora 15,000
  - Kaiapoi (was) 10,000
  - Woodend 3,000
  - Pegasus (new) town – (to be) 5,000
- Large part of east coast in liquefaction susceptible zone
- Major river breakout flooding risks for Kaiapoi and Rangiora
- Kaiapoi/coast Tsunami risk
- Winter/snow – Summer/fire hazards
- Other than that a pretty nice place!
Damage Across the Community (1)
Damage Across The Community (2)
## Contexts for Recovery Mgmt.

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<td><strong>Relatively low intensity/short duration event, but wider geographic area affected.</strong> Requires cross boundary coordination /regional level resourcing. Larger/more dispersed number of homes/businesses affected. Enhanced recovery co-ordination and planning structures/processes required.</td>
<td><strong>Large scale event(s). Widespread and severe damage. Fatalities, injuries, homelessness and business interruption.</strong> Local, regional, national coordination. Enhanced/customised recovery assistance, programmes. 2-10 years duration. Major recovery plans and programmes and major public/private leadership and integration required.</td>
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<td><strong>Localised event of short duration, within one Council area.</strong> Acute response, short recovery term/limited task. Frequent occurrence, e.g. severe winter snow storm, large flood events. Small no of homes/businesses affected. Short duration Recovery Management Team, quick revert to existing BAU structures/processes.</td>
<td><strong>Severe to very severe localised event, e.g. earthquake with aftershocks protracting recovery. 10s to 100s of displaced households/businesses. Significant infrastructure damage. May be fatalities, likely injuries. Longer term recovery. Initial RMT + augmented BAU. Significant Regional and Private Sector co-ordination.</strong></td>
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[Source](waimakariri.govt.nz)
Recovery Readiness Issues

- Transition from response to recovery – after the EOC closes
- What really is the scope/damage/skills/resources required
- Are you at the centre or the periphery of the main event
- We should be good at Infrastructure and Facilities...its social and economic where there are usually gaps and uncertainties
- If its big then your whole organisation is part of the recovery team
- Extent/nature of insurance issues and sector involvement is key
- Managed retreat is a game changer
- Recovery governance important is overlooked
- Just how long is this going to last and the twists and turns
Complexity, Insurance and Delay

- Ongoing disaster - shaking for around two years
- Unprecedented insurance complexity and scale – liability between events and players – High Court decisions re: apportionment and 90+ residential insurance policies in play
- Extended land classification process – still continuing on Port Hills
- Revised building code requirements
- “new ground’ in testing and developing foundations solutions for damaged land/liquefaction resilience
- Large scale claims and project management systems to develop and deploy
- ‘New’ recovery management arrangements with/lead by a Govt. Dept. but an insurance led recovery
Insurance Scale

Historical Comparison of Event Size

- Inangahua 1968
- Gisborne 2007
- Fiordland 2009
- 4 September 2010
- 22 February 2011
- Other Canterbury Events 2010/11

- Claims Lodged
- Estimated major Wellington earthquake (2009 Review)
- Estimated large scale event target (2009 Review)
Quakes Damage - Waimakariri

- 70%+ homes damaged – most minor but moderate to severe land/building damage to Town of Kaiapoi (10,000 Pop’n) and two small beach settlements
- Initially 2,000 homes lost utility services and 300 made uninhabitable – services to occupied homes temporarily restored after six weeks
- Initial plans for full rebuild of 1,000 severely damaged homes/properties – now 1,100 properties ‘Red Zoned’ (25% of town) and insured property owners made a Crown purchase offer due to severity of land damage and residual risks
- Red zone meant much reduced rebuild/infrastructure restoration programme but large scale accelerated new residential development in “greenfield” areas
- Major damage to/loss of social/community infrastructure in Kaiapoi...less so elsewhere – 23 facilities to replace/repair/strengthen
- Significant loss of commercial buildings/businesses in Kaiapoi Town Centre (40%)
- Incremental loss of commercial buildings strength/increased standards mean substantial disruption from 2012 onwards to Rangiora Town Centre (20%)
Response to Recovery Activation

Sept. 2010: Welfare Centres
Oct. 2010: Recovery Assistance Centre
Earthquake Recovery ‘Portacom Village’ established:
Dec. 2010: Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service (WESS) - ‘walk alongside’ to present
Pastoral Care Team ‘reach out’
Information Management

- 2010 - paper based EOC...pre-EMIS ...Registration of affected persons, households and businesses ‘primitive’
- No real response to recovery management information that was usable - (re)configured CRM to suit case management, but still not what was really needed
- Need relational data model that encompasses people-households-homes-properties and businesses-tenants-properties and their attributes, through extended time
- System should be web deliverable with data sharing capacity and appropriate security
Council Structure V1.3 @ 8 wks.
Timeline / Phases – First 15 mths

- 4/9 – 2,000+ properties services disrupted, approx. 500 red/yellow placards by 10/9; welfare centres established; significant town centre business disruption and social/community infrastructure damage
- 13/9 – Water supply restored to boundary
- 16/9 – State of emergency lifted
- 20/9 – Recovery Assistance Centre opens
  Oct/Nov ’10 – Infrastructure Recovery Unit establishment at Rangiora portacoms
- 7/10 – Kaiapoi TC planning engagement sessions begin
- 26/10 – all occupied homes have functioning sewer
- Nov’10 – Streetscape Team barbecues begin
- 6/11 – River discharges cease
- 27/11 – Kaiapoi Temporary Library established
- Dec ’10 – Hub established, Coordinated rebuild programming, Weekly Hub Operations meetings begin with Insurers/PMOs
- 7/12 – 22/12 – 6 Community Engagement Meetings
- 23/12 – Preferred contractors for works confirmed
- Jan’11 – Water Supply Replacement Strategy completed
- 10/1 – Support co-ordination service starts at Kaiapoi Hub, Social Recovery Manager appointed
- 12/1 – Coordination Forum Meetings begin
- 8/2 – Roading, water supply and stormwater contracts awarded
- Feb ’11 – Kairaki permanent sewer repairs
- 17/2 – Kaiapoi Earthquake Hub officially opened
- Feb ’11 – Roading damage assessments completed
- Feb ’11 – Funding commitment for Streetscape restoration received from NZ Transport Agency
- 19/2 – Public consultation for draft Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan commenced
- 22/2 – Waimakariri District Council Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) opens to support Christchurch Response Centre, Christchurch residents and the Waimakariri community
- 23/2 – Tuahiwi Marae and the Rangiora Baptist Church Welfare Centres open
- 4/3 – EOC and Rangiora Baptist Church Welfare Centres close
- 11/3 – Land Remediation Memorandum of Understanding agreed
- 17/3 – Smith Street restoration works get underway
- 19/3 – Public consultation for draft Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan extended following 22 Feb earthquake
- 22/3 – 13/4 - Rebuild programme presented to 2,700 Zone B & C residents at 9 Community Meetings
- Apr ’11 – North side perimeter works consent application consultation
- 29/4 – Public consultation for draft Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan closed; hearings 10/11 May
- May ’11 – South side perimeter works consent application consultation
- May ’11 – Draft Final Streetscape Restoration consultation
- 31/5-2/6 – Community Meetings with 2011 clusters - first clusters demolitions programmed subject to approvals, settlements, finalised designs and temp accomm.
- 7/6 – Draft Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan presented to Council for adoption
- 8/6 – Minister suspends programme in light of seismic model change
- 13/6 – further major aftershocks; 23/6 – 1600 Orange/70 Red Zone properties
- Jul. – Temporary accommodation Village opens at Kaiapoi Domain
- 18/8 – 940 Red/70 Orange Zone/balance Green Zone
- Aug-Sept. – WDC/CERA Community Meetings; purchase offers to red zones
- 16/9 – Kaiapoi Earthquake information Hub opens
- Oct./Nov. – Technical Category 1-3 Zones for Building foundations/structures
- 10 & 11 Dec. ’11 – Kaiapoi Housing Expo
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2010-14: Damaging quakes, wind, floods, groundwater resurgence
Overall Approach

“Our success will not be measured by the kilometers of pipe and road that we replace, but by how the people come through this”

Jim Palmer, Chief Executive,
Waimakariri District Council, October 2010
Key Recovery Principles

- People & business first, Engineering second!
- Physical works are just one of the tools for achieving the recovery
- Partnership approach to recovery delivery - meaningful relationships/practical partnerships
- Integration and coordination critical – the process of recovery is an important aspect of success
- Close engagement with residents – not ‘just’ comms
Principles cont.....

- Local scale and a ‘sense of urgency’ essential
- Work with the community’s strengths - its people and their networks
- Dedicated resource and focus
- The recovery effort is accessible, available and visible in the affected community
- Be community centric, adaptable, flexible and nimble.
- Do what it takes to restore, rebuild, revitalise, regenerate
Key Recovery Asset

“What most people believe and what actually happens in the aftermath of a disaster are two different things. The movies, the media, and the authorities have too often insisted that we are a chaotic, selfish species and ought to fear each other. Yet in the wake of almost every major disaster a wave of altruistic and brave improvisation saves lives, forms communities, and shapes many survivors experiences.

The most startling thing about disasters ... is not merely that so many people rise to the occasion, but that they do so with joy. That joy reveals an ordinarily unmet yearning for community, purposefulness, and meaningful work that disaster often provides.

These spontaneous acts, emotions, and communities suggest that many of the utopian ideals of the past century are not only possible, but latent in everyday life. A disaster can be a moment when the forces that keep these ideals from flowering, those desires from being realised, fall away.”

Rebecca Solnit 2009 (A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster)
Recovery Values

- Visible Leadership (Council and staff)
- Open Communication and Engagement (tell them what we know when we know it and what we don’t know)
- Co-ordination and Integration (‘collaborate ‘til it hurts’)
- Work with the Community’s Strengths (huge good will – use it!)
Engagement

- “Mass communications” and “community engagement” are closely linked with and reinforcing of each other
- Strong emphasis on face to face – 11,000+ attendances at community meetings
- Say what we know and what we don’t know
- Aim to be accessible, to listen and to observe
- Aim to answer ALL questions and find answers where we can
- Noticeboards, newsletters, large and small meetings, display adverts, media releases, website: www.newfoundations.org.nz presentations, columns, door knocking, phone calls, surveys, mail drops....
Immediately following each series of residents’ meetings an FAQ booklet was issued, answering the questions raised at those meetings.
Kaiapoi Earthquake Hub

- **WDC Kaiapoi Service Centre** - Council’s permanent library/service centre closed due to earthquake damage - temporarily relocated to Community Centre adjacent to and acts as Hub Reception
- **WDC Infrastructure recovery** engineers, project managers and consultants
- **WDC Social recovery** management and **community development** advisors
- **WDC Building Unit** consenting staff
- **WDC Earthquake Communications** Coordinator
- **CETAS Accommodation advice**
- **WESS - Support coordinators** and **Kaitoko advisers** – up to 500 H/hs supported at any one time
- **EQC and Insurance Company** repair/rebuild **project managers**
- **WDC's economic development agency Business recovery advisor**
- **Hub Stages 2 and 3** Sept 2011 – March 2014 - CERA, EQC, Insurer reps, Bank reps, Tenant’s Protection Assn., Community Law and other advisers by appt.
Co-ordination

THE RESIDENTS OF KAIAPOI, THE PINES BEACH AND KAIRAKI
Recap on Context

- Two disaster zones: primary area - in/around Kaiapoi with moderate to severe damage; secondary area - rest of District with light to moderate damage except Rangiora Town Centre
- Strong desire by the Council to exercise visible leadership of recovery across all areas and spheres
- High priority afforded to community engagement, social wellbeing and economic recovery
- Major stretch on WDC finances/rating for community facilities and public realm...’Quakes debt for a generation’
- ‘Fast growth’ taken over from intensive recovery phase
- Six Main recovery programmes...
Recovery Programmes, 2012-15

- Red Zone Transition Management
- Green Zone Rebuild Programme
- Community Facilities and Reserves Rebuild and Restoration Programme
- Town Centres Strategies/Business Support Programme
- Accelerated Residential Development Programme
- Social Recovery – Support, Community Engagement & Regeneration Programme
Programme Status (1)

1. Red zone Transition:
   - Largely complete to vacant/’tidied’ state except retained properties
   - WDC Infrastructure requirements well known
   - Future use process well underway but making haste slowly

2. Infrastructure Rebuild:
   - Largely complete except for RZ components to serve adjoining areas
   - Pace dependent on RZ future use resolution...delay an impediment to recovery esp. for TC3 community

3. Community Facilities:
   - Replacement/rebuild/strengthening largely complete for Council facilities
   - Some damaged community owned facilities still undetermined

4. Town Centres Rebuild:
   - Visible progress but hard work and a long way to go to be fully functional
   - Business support initiatives at an end bar soon to decommission WDC temp. business accomm. as new f’space comes on stream
5. Accelerated Residential Development:
- +200% on long run average new dwellings for 3 years “9 yrs growth in 3yrs”
- +1,000 new dwelling consents in Kaiapoi over 3 yrs ‘replacing’ 1,100 RZ dwellings
- 27 EPH units ‘lost in RZ’ replaced mid-2014
- Enabling provision for whanau housing on Maori Reserve 873 almost operative
- Big demands on planning, consenting, infrastructure delivery, community facilities and development

6. Social Recovery and Community Regeneration
- ‘Earthquake information Hub’ (connect and resolve) in Kaiapoi as base for recovery services in final stage
- ‘Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service’ (walk alongside) at peak 800 households; now 30
- ‘Pastoral Care Team’ (reach out) wound up mid-2014
- ‘Rubble Rousers’ and ‘Rangiora 7440’ - WD versions of ‘Gap Fillers’ winding out;
- ‘YOU-ME-WE-US’ community projects initiative, (re)building networks/social capital active
- ‘Social Services Waimakariri’ – preexisting Agencies and NGOs network in leadership position
Red Zone Transition

- Most RZ areas at risk from liquefaction damage, flooding (river, sea level rise effects); some lateral spread and tsunami prone
- Crown position – “it is an offer” – no decision about use of compulsory acquisition powers – ‘Stayers’ minority – service continuance?
- Significant concern about fairness and equity of valuation base used to construct the offer – “winners and losers”
- Many modest homes red zoned – cost of ‘comparable’ replacement property, esp. new housing, far in excess
- Major wellbeing support for RZ households required as they navigate the process – ‘issue upon issue’ and some casualties
- Possible to envisage a range of alternative uses – major greenspace, recreational values...potential regeneration projects
- Property clearance process protracted
Pace of Settlement

Properties settled with the Government: January 2012 - April 2013

Note: First offers made Aug 2011: last Kaiapoi settlement Apr 2014 following review and extensions processes. Approx. 9 months to get to 50% settlement; 20 mths to 75% and 32 mths to 100% of those accepting the offer.
Some 36 Kaiapoi (3.5%) property owners eventually declined the offer and retained their properties.
NOTES
1) Existing infrastructure within the RRZ, which is programmed to be abandoned, is not shown.
2) Any infrastructure required to service existing privately owned properties within the RRZ is not shown.
3) Power and communication infrastructure services are not shown.

Refer to sheet 2 for details in this area.
Canvas: your thinking for the red zones

December 2014

A summary of findings from the public engagement on the future use of the red zones in the Waimakariri District

New Zealand Government

Base: Waimakariri District residents who are aware of Canvas, excluding not answered (n=270)
Future Use Ideas
Red Zone Futures

Despite uncertainty around how the Red Zones are to be used, the Council believes it is prudent to plan and budget for contributing to their future development — not only for the benefit of the immediate Kaiapoi and The Pines/Kaiapoi communities but also in adding to amenity and enjoyment opportunities for the whole District. There are between 60 and 80 hectares of ‘Red Zone’ land that may be available for community use. This will need developing and maintaining and there could be significant land management responsibilities on the Council depending on the decision from Central Government about roles and responsibilities.

$6.76 million over eight years has been allocated in the Draft Long Term Plan for the restoration of Red Zone areas for future recreational, business or environmental use.

This will be funded District-wide so that the impacts of the earthquakes and the subsequent repairs and restoration are shared broadly by all properties in the District.

**MAKE A SUBMISSION:** What do you think about this provisional allocation for the Council to contribute to Red Zone future use?
Community Facilities Rebuild (Dec. 14)

- Twenty three community buildings repaired/strengthened to be at or above 67% of NBS
- Three major buildings are being rebuilt/extended with all being open to the community by March 2015 – next slide
- Four buildings assessed and awaiting minor strengthening to achieve 67% or greater of code
- Two buildings are awaiting seismic assessment
- Three are awaiting a decision as to their future and are closed for public use
- Five have been demolished since September 2010
• Ruataniwha Kaiapoi Civic Centre, opened Jan. 2015
• Oxford Town Hall, reopened, Feb. 2015
• Rangiora Town Hall performance & cinema complex, reopened, Mar. 2015
Town Centres/Business Support

- Accelerated Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan preparation and implementation
- Business support (circa 200 businesses in Kaiapoi town centre – 25% relocated/not trading)
  - 1:1 support, capability assessments
  - Workshops, Motivation, Mentoring
  - Marketing - Shop Kaiapoi!
- District local economic development strategy – business attraction
- Provision of temporary business accommodation
- Rangiora Town Centre 2020 Strategy – accelerated implementation
- Marketing - Shop Local Rangiora!
- Public buildings and public works investment
- Land swaps/PPPs/collaborative planning
- Ongoing communications...business updates, community briefings, etc...
KEY:

- BUSINESS 1 ZONE - DISTRICT PLAN
- BUILDING SUBJECT TO DETAILED ENGINEERING EVALUATION. (DEMOLITION, REPAIR OR REBUILD)
- TO BE DEMOLISHED. (NO BUILDING OR RESOURCE CONSENT FOR REBUILD)
- DEMOLITION CARRIED OUT. (NO BUILDING OR RESOURCE CONSENT FOR REBUILD)
- TO BE REBUILD, STRENGTHENED OR REPAIRED. (BUILDING AND/OR RESOURCE CONSENT UNDER PROCESS OR APPROVED)
- REBUILD, STRENGTHENED OR REPAIRED.

TOTALS:

- OPEN: 8
- CLOSED: 1

NOTE: UNCOLOURED BUILDINGS ARE/WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE DERA ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
Communications avenues

- Website – town centre web pages
- Facebook – photo updates for projects
- Newspaper – media releases and advertising
- FYI – town centre update newsletter
- and more...
Robbies / Junction Hotel
Where Are People Post-Disaster?

Classically, four phases are described after a disaster, although separating them out as distinct phases with sharp transitions is somewhat artificial:

(1) An initial **heroic phase**, in which people help and don’t count the “costs”.

(2) A **honeymoon phase** in which people see some help arriving and feel that the situation will improve.

(3) A third phase which is somewhat awkwardly and unhelpfully termed the ‘**disillusionment phase**’ in which people realize how long recovery will take and become angry and frustrated. I would prefer to call it the long-term recovery and rehabilitation phase.

(4) Finally people return to a new equilibrium, but we must understand that this is a long-term process with no clear endpoint in that things can never return to exactly what they were before the disaster, although people will find a ‘**new normal**’.

Professor Sir Peter Gluckman, NZ Govt. Chief Science Advisor, “The Psychosocial Consequences of the Canterbury Earthquakes, A Briefing Paper, 10 May 2011
Social Recovery – the ‘Three Legged Stool’

- Earthquake Support Co-ordination Service – *walk alongside*
  - 1:1 support navigation
  - Local people who know & care about the community
  - Make links to available services

- Information Hub – *connect and resolve*
  - Appointments with responsible agencies
  - Source of knowledge and advice

- Pastoral Care Team – *reach out*
  - Door knocks, checking in on people
  - ‘Cup of tea and a chat’
  - Link people in with Support Co-ordinators and Info Hub services
Secondary Stressors ‘Nth of the River’

- Insurance complexity, delay and equity of outcome all telling on wellbeing...a small but evident segment still ‘in the thick of it’ to varying degrees (incl Chch ‘diaspora’)
- Loss of town centre amenity and community facilities a real negative across the whole community
- Rental stock loss, escalating rents and house prices have exacerbated preexisting housing stress for vulnerable groups
- Protracted, elevated demands on social agencies and NGOs...tired and overworked staff...constant funding insecurity
- Northern access to Christchurch at peak times hugely stressing with significant ‘relief’ 3+ yrs away
- Social isolation and integration for/with ‘newcomers’
Housing Impacts

- Major housing stresses now evident – mitigated by initial population loss but RZ relocation, GZ rebuild & migratory temporary workforce requirements biting
- House sale price inflation in the Waimakariri District to Oct 2013 compared to pre-earthquake levels +27% (+23% Chch)
- Average house rental price increase in the District July 2011-Nov 2013 was +35% (+36% in Chch)
- The per month availability of rentals in the District less than $300 per week decreased by 80% to Nov.2013 (-67% in Chch), as compared to pre earthquake levels;
- Bond registered rental stock in the Waimakariri District has overall declined by 15% 2011-13 – conversion to home ownership in part due to red zone relocation
Waimakariri District: Consents for New Dwellings 1986 - 2014

Number of Consents for Dwellings

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Consequences of ‘Fast Growth’

- Statutory ‘Land Use Recovery Plan (LURP) mandated 30+ yrs greenfield growth across Greater Chch in 15 years
- Waimakariri District = ‘9 years growth in 3 years’
- Huge demands on planning, consenting, infrastructure delivery, community facilities and development
- While % local job self sufficiency improving, big absolute jump in commuters – in combination with significant change in Chch job destinations/route disruption proving very challenging for all
- Major challenges for WDC finances as well!
Learnings from Elsewhere (1)

- **Recovery is real life at high speed.** Normal planning problems magnified and issues and needs compressed both in time and space.
- **Decisions need to be made faster** than information, knowledge, and planning generally flow
- **Inequities and pre-disaster trends** often exacerbated due to simultaneous and competing demands for limited resources
- **“Windows of opportunity”** for major change and betterment of land uses, facilities, and infrastructure arise due to concentrated elimination of urban elements which reduces the opportunity cost of changes; these opportunities open and close in time
Learning From Elsewhere (2)

- The **currencies of recovery** are **money** and **information**. Their flows need to match recovery pace.
- **Success measured by both speed and quality** (which often conflict). Need to **plan** and **act** simultaneously
- **Planning needs time** for participants to acquire and comprehend information, build trust, consider alternatives, and feel confidence in the decisions
- Trade off between speed and deliberation best made by **active citizen involvement** and **good communication**

Laurie Johnson, per comm.
Recovery Practice Implications

- ‘Classic’ CDEM RMT and Group structures work fine with localised/short duration/moderate impact events.
- Widespread/severe/longer lasting events require more customised structures, capable of rapid adjustment and involve an exponential increase in players and so required coordination.
- Resourcing requirements of major event recovery means unlikely to be able to implement through dedicated RMT approach – hybrid structures apply and essential public/private coordination cannot be achieved by hierarchical design.
- The culture of recovery is fundamentally different to response.
Practice Implications contd.

- High severity and long duration events mean social and economic recovery is extensive and most important - but these are ‘at the edge’ of most Councils mandates – esp. with new LGA purpose
- Secondary stressors during the recovery phase and consequential impacts of the disaster add additional complexity and challenge not well captured in recovery structures and programmes, e.g. housing market impacts
- What does recovery look like? when does it end? and exit strategies for recovery programmes? - all problematic issues
- The Canterbury Earthquake sequence recovery experience highlights the need to attend to the resiliency of structures and illustrates the best and the worst of recovery management practice
Some of what we have learnt

- Recovery is about businesses, communities and people, not just rebuilding physical things
  - We must engage with our businesses and wider communities - listen & work with them
  - We need to provide physical places/opportunities for business survival and support
  - Work with what’s in the community - empowerment vs victims
  - Have honest community conversations - information, knowledge, decision-making processes
  - Have trust & belief, build confidence, share success and sorrow

- We need to build in risk reduction/resilience for future events – low hazard/risk doesn’t mean no hazard/risk

- Social and economic preparedness and recovery are vital

- We need to be adaptable and flexible

- Leadership & collaboration are key – pre-event planning and recovery are like patchwork quilts – every patch has to fit together with the next
Recovery Manager Role

- Strive for visible **Leadership** – sense needs, make plans, take initiatives, manage relationships
- Seek **Integration** – across jurisdictions and programmes
- Promote **Coordination** within and among agencies
- Lead and promote **Engagement** with the community and agencies

...You will:
- need to manage your role(s) and personal resilience
- You/your family will likely be affected in a larger event...